

5X1

Product Improvement -2  
Consumer NeedsNSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
7/2/03.SubjectTabMemo from Chief, PRG to D/DCI/IC, Subj: Conversation  
with Messrs. Ernst [REDACTED], OER, re Economic  
Intelligence, 2/16/72

1

NIS Program: Memo from D/OBGI to DCI, Progress Report  
on Proposal to Phase Out Detailed Sections, 4/17/72;  
Comments from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]; memo from Thomas  
to Tweedy, 5/10/72 (IC 72-0330)

2

Report on Bill Hyland's Suggestion for Obtaining Guidance,  
memo for Chief, PRG, from Andrew Marshall, NSC, 9 May 72,  
and reply from Chief, PRG to Marshall, 16 May 72  
Memo for [REDACTED] from A. Marshall, 19 May 72,  
Subj: Further Thoughts on Obtaining Guidance (IC 72-0420)

3

[REDACTED] Suggestion for DCI Organization for  
SALT Verification, 29 June 72

4

Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR (re consumer  
needs for intelligence on MBFR problems), 11 August  
1972, MOR by [REDACTED]

5

President's needs for intelligence in Southeast  
Asia (memo for IC Staff from Mr. Parrott, 11/9/71)

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OMS/PSS contacts with Andy Marshall re possible studies  
for Dr. Kissinger

7

Andy Marshall's interest in decision making processes of  
foreign countries - Working Group papers

8

Andy Marshall's staff's ideas on polling consumers  
Memo to [REDACTED] from Marshall, 11/10/72

9

Army, DIA, DOS, ONI, NSC and USAF  
review(s) completed.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 10, 1972

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
7/2/03.

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TO:

25X1  
NSC

FROM:


A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

After our October 26 meeting, Chip and I discussed your plan to review NIEs and to develop techniques to poll consumers. Both ideas are good and I would like to be kept informed as your plans progress. Chip wrote me a short paper presenting our initial ideas on polling consumers.

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NSC

ATTACHMENT

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N86C

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FOR MR. A. W. MARSHALL

SUBJECT: R&amp;D In Analysis and Presentation

R&D efforts need a two fold approach. First, there must be a continuous effort to develop new or find old methods to analyze problems and test their applicability to intelligence situations. Second, research needs to investigate how the results of analysis can be best communicated to the consumer. The first deals with improving the intrinsic quality of the analytical effort. The second recognizes that products not sensitive to, or not aimed at, needs are lost in the noise of the input streams that policy-makers are confronted with in reaching decisions.

#### R&D In Analytical Techniques

Research in exploring new analytical techniques is insufficient in the community. Some attention is given to the use of new methods of analysis now, but the rate of innovation is low. Effort is needed in introducing analysts to rigorous, alternative approaches to replace their present and, perhaps, overly individualistic intuitive methods. Organizational behavior, models of decisionmaking processes, psychological evaluative approaches, and the Bayesian techniques are examples of immediate relevance, but these are only a sample of what may be available in the academic and business community as methods to view problems.

The process of finding and using new methods involves four distinct stages:

- The search effort to locate methodologies. (Intellectual)
- The test phase in which a method is applied to specific intelligence problems, or is evaluated in some other fashion, to assess its value in analysis. (Intellectual).
- The dissemination phase when the method is catalogued, entered into doctrine and passed to analysts through training and other methods. (Managerial)
- The implementation phase when the new method is employed and its employment and effectiveness is monitored. (Managerial)

Each stage involves different people in different levels of the organization and demands different levels of competence. For example, the search effort requires individuals experienced in

intelligence but also having an appreciation for research techniques. The emphasis here is not on people who are good at research per se but on those who can find techniques for research. They must visit organizations outside the community, review literature and exploit other sources of assistance (eg: ARPA can provide some funding; intelligence training units may provide motivated manpower). Testing a methodology requires bringing a method to bear on a problem and may involve having analysts learn and use the method, finding issues on which it can be used, developing experimental products and checking with consumers for their opinions. Having established the validity of a new approach the effort moves from the more intellectual tasks to the managerial problems of implementation and operation. At this point it may be more appropriate to use a group of managers rather than research oriented individuals.

Considering that present community effort in this area is very small I think DCI level action is initially needed to give visibility and support to the task. I realize that there are disadvantages in that lower level managers may be antagonistic to upper level initiatives and that analysts are farther away from the effort. A lower (DI and DDI) approach would bring the R&D task closer to those daily concerned with products. However, what might result is the loss of top level exposure and the increased cost of fragmented efforts in different organizations. I would prefer to see such involvement grow gradually from the DCI activity as experience is gained in what is available and how it can be used.

Initially a four - five man team of expert intelligence hands could be formed to conduct liaison with outside organizations (schools, research organizations, etc.) and to research literature in order to isolate approaches and develop their potential for intelligence. Subcontracting might be used to have specialists examine problems testing potentially useful methodologies. ARPA is one source of funding, and this would be an understandable technique since the community is unlikely to be familiar with a new approach. Testing could also be done internally by tasking agencies to examine problems using specific methods. Innovative products resulting from both efforts could then be provided to users for their reaction. If favorable, these methodologies could become doctrine in training curriculum, papers and analyses.

Reaching the goals of this scenario poses difficult problems in dealing with analysts locked into old approaches and with managers who see no wrong with past or current analytical methods. In the long-term diversifying the approach to problems requires altering the manner in which we handle people -- whom we select, how we train and what we reward. In the short run, however, it is important to give alternate approaches visibility so that motivated analysts will see and test them, aggressive managers will encourage experimentation, and policymakers will see their possibilities. Consequently, I favor DCI level action. Also this will probably encourage other agencies to develop their own efforts, as DOD elements have been doing. Experimental products for Kissinger resulting from this type of work will probably give less willing agencies a signal to what is needed.

### Presentations

Service to consumers is the principal job of the community; yet its output is frequently insensitive to consumer needs because (a) there is inadequate awareness of what users need or ~~what~~ **WANT** (the sensitivity issue), and (b) products are not designed with an appreciation for the time consumers have to study them (the communication issue). Let me caveat my comment by recognizing that the community serves a number of consumers in addition to those at the highest level; however, this problem probably exists with most customers of community products. Also getting consumers to give guidance is a problem; yet the community is not making enough of an effort on its own to use presently available contacts and sources to define what user needs are.

Improvements in both sensitivity and communication should at least come from some present work, provided the community takes action. The NSCIC reviews should highlight communication problems between user and producer. The community needs to take these to heart and develop techniques to prevent their reoccurrence. Research in analytical methods will affect presentations--for example, examination of Bayesian techniques gives ideas on how to best communicate to users the level of uncertainty associated with analyses and conclusions. The DCI staff in its examination of community output could generate both economies and improvements in presentations.

Additional techniques which could be used to study the sensitivity and communication problem include:

- Development of experimental products (which we are doing).
- Wider distribution of speculative papers attributable to analysts and caveated as non-agency positions (both INR and DIA have provided thought provoking material).

--Research on consumers' needs by reading their papers, studying their speeches, and examining their actions and needs in the past (we are doing a form of this for Kissinger).

--Using interviews and developing innovative techniques to get feedback from consumers.

--Conducting product reviews.

Developing a unified overall approach to improve presentations is more difficult in my view than for R&D in analytical methods. One encounters the same problems in resistance to change, compartmentalization and community size. Additionally, however, good products are tailored to the needs of each user, whereas new analytical methods probably would have more common use across the community. To understand each user's needs requires an intimate study of what types of decisions he makes, what forces act on him, what information he does or does not have and what catches his attention. This knowledge must then be combined with an understanding of the resources available in the community to serve him.

This critical need to tailor products to individual users leads me to believe that a development effort in presentation techniques would best be centered at lower than the DCI level, probably at the DDI or DI echelon. DCI level interest and concern, plus encouragement from the NAG, could create a high level interest and instigate a sense of competition which would motivate less innovative managers. Given the present resources probably available, I would suggest an approach in the near term with three elements:

--Using the results of NSCIC studies and other projects being undertaken at DCI and NSC level to develop guidance to pass to program managers.

--Loosening restrictions on speculative products and experimental outputs at DDI and DI.

--Conducting reviews of the needs of specific policymakers (the President, Kissinger, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State) by reviewing their writings, speeches and past actions; this could be done at the level responsible for the support (ie.--INR study Secretary of State, DCI study the President, DIA study Secretary of Defense).

A final point is that thought must be given to the overall question of the community's implicit perception of meeting consumers needs.

One needs to ask who is the consumer--what is he reading, how frequently, in what context, etc? From a general description of the types of consumers, one could then examine present outputs to see if they fit needs. For example, my impression is that many outputs are smorgasbord documents, written for everyone and giving each less than is needed. It would be more valuable to prepare analytical documents for analysts to communicate with each other, policymaker outputs which take intelligence and apply it to policy issues for decisionmakers, position documents in order to give intelligence people a place from which to make improvements, and newsy documents to satisfy peripheral consumers seeking background data. Each type of document requires different analysis, review procedures, formats and distribution.



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DCI/IC 72-0890

13 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Herbert Jenne

X1A

SUBJECT : 13 November 1972 Meeting With  
Mr. Andrew Marshall, 302A, Executive  
Office Building

1. The above and undersigned CIA officials met with Mr. Marshall at his request. The purpose of the meeting, according to Mr. Marshall, was to set up a working group to stimulate research on the decision making processes of foreign countries. He suggested that this group meet at monthly intervals.

2. He proposed that the initial tasks of this working group should be to address the following three questions; (1) what are the relevant data, (2) what is the current availability of these data, and (3) what steps can be taken to fill in the detected gaps?

3. Mr. Marshall indicated that Dr. Kissinger and members of the NSC Staff wanted detailed analyses on government behavior and decision making as a framework to understand military, political and economic developments in the Soviet Union and other countries. Mr. Marshall said that he needed more "illuminating, interesting, speculative" hypotheses on decision making to provide a context for the available data and to alert collectors and analysts to concentrate on the behavior of organizations.

4. He asked the members of the working group to think about the relevant data question and propose topics for the next meeting. After the meeting, members of the group informally decided to meet in Mr. Jenne's office (7G00) at 0900 on 15 November (Wednesday) to respond to Mr. Marshall.

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has file 25X1A  
on subsequent actions

CONFIDENTIAL

DDI-2824-72

DCI/IC 72-08181

19 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Product Review Group,  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : Andy Marshall's Request for  
Information on Foreign Decision  
Making

1. This is in response to your request of 17 October for the names of individuals to be passed to Andy Marshall so that he can discuss with them the processes of decision making in countries of major U. S. intelligence interests.

2. This is a subject which Andy has discussed with me and with a number of people in this Directorate and DDS&T, including [ ] and Bruce Clarke and members of his staff, as well as John Huizenga and members of his staff. Given the extent of all these discussions, I really don't understand what the new inquiry is about. It may be that Andy wishes to discuss some facet not previously covered. If this is the case and Andy will contact me, I will be able to identify the people with whom he could talk.

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[ ]  
EDWARD W. PROCTOR  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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17 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Targeting Information on Foreign Decision Making

1. During a conference last week with Bronson Tweedy, Andy Marshall of the NSC Staff discussed his interest in getting a dialogue underway with CIA analysts on the problems involved in obtaining and analyzing information which relates to the manner in which important decisions are reached in countries of major U.S. intelligence interest. He asked Bronson to arrange for him to be put in contact with CIA personnel who were interested in or had some experience with identifying the kinds of information which need to be targeted to provide basis for evaluation of a decision-making process.

2. I already have given Andy the name of [redacted] of [redacted] who worked with Andy on a related matter several years ago.

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3. Bronson asked me to pass along his request that you provide me with the names of any DDI personnel with whom Andy could talk on this subject.

[redacted]  
Chief, PRG/IC

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JET:vdm

Distribution:

orig - addressee


① - PRG subject (filed Product Imp -1)

1 - [redacted] chrono

1 - PRG chrono

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13 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andrew Marshall, 10 October 1972

The following points were discussed with Andy Marshall at a meeting in his office:

a. Marshall found the two PRG studies very useful and wants to give some thought to possible follow-up. He will make some suggestions, which we can discuss, and we would then be in a position to recommend action to the Working Group.

b. Marshall discussed Jeanne Davis, who heads up the NSC Secretariat, pointing out she had had some qualms about copies of memoranda to Kissinger being laterally disseminated. In the case of the Indo-Pakistan study, Mrs. Davis will send a memorandum to the other addressees asking for their written comments by 15 November. Marshall and I agreed that a useful future procedure with memoranda to Kissinger stemming from Working Group activities would be for me to call Marshall, who after all is closest to Mrs. Davis, so that he can inform her what we plan to do with other dissemination and he can get her advice and concurrence.

*Extracted & filed  
main NSC file*

c. Marshall discussed the situation on his various studies. The Fedayeen/Jordan study is going all right. The Middle East study is "staggering along," as the study chairman is being a bit superficial. Marshall said he would try to apply some pressure to get a deeper analysis. On LAMSON 719, [redacted] thinks it will be a useful study and can be done (Proctor to the contrary). [redacted] is off on two weeks' leave and is going to return to the subject in early November.

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On the subject of studies, Marshall felt we ought to be able to stay away from total reliance on experts, who more often than not also turn out to be the authors of the studies under consideration. He asked whether it wouldn't be possible to make greater use of the consumer community, agreeing with me that it was probably out of the question and probably inefficient to attempt to get these things studied by people outside the Government. I promised to talk to Ed Proctor on this.

~~SECRET~~

d. On Dr. Post's psychological studies, what Marshall hopes to do is to have Post make himself free enough to prepare a couple of sample studies expressly for Kissinger. Marshall would consult with Post on selecting the target individuals and the type of study wanted, and would then show the final product to Kissinger. I will inform

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I raised with Marshall the problem of the intelligence community getting no feedback at all from Kissinger's unique experiences in his various foreign negotiations (Soviets, Chinese, North Vietnamese, etc. ). I pointed out that if he should leave this world tomorrow or even leave the Government at some point, there would be a large vacuum to represent all that he had experienced. I pointed out this was not a question of finding out what the President was offering Hanoi to get the war finished but rather the totality of his experience with the North Vietnamese hierarchy; the same being true of the Soviets and the Chinese. One of these days, you can bet your hat, he will ask why we don't know more about Brezhnev and we will be in a nice position to come back and say because he never told us! Marshall agreed it was a major problem and promised to address himself to it.

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f. Marshall again brought up the problem of whether the DCI could bring his NSC-type briefings into better coordination with State and DIA. I said I thought it would be better to address this question if this could be made one of the points from Kissinger or the NSCIC as a result of Working Group submissions to them. He agreed.

g. Finally, we discussed briefly what sort of intelligence product Kissinger, and thus the President, sees. Marshall made it clear this was basically the product of the White House Situation Room and this is apparently a real dog's breakfast--any type of current intelligence reporting (including the CIB and the DIA daily, NSA reports, miscellaneous cables from around the world, selections picked out by the NSC staff, sometimes including a letter from the Secretary of State with highlights of overseas reporting, and bits and pieces from the PDB). Although I never was fully able to pin it down, I didn't gather that either Kissinger or the President very often saw the PDB in the form in which it leaves this building. Marshall concluded by saying that Kissinger himself was necessarily crisis oriented.



Bronson Tweedy

25X1A

cc: C/PRG/IC ✓

*also filed  
under NSCIC WS-B*

~~SECRET~~

DIR-7783  
DDG 72-3860  
DCI/IC 72-0598

Executive Registry  
72-4077

19 JUL 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Andrew Marshall's Major Interests in Intelligence

1. The views in this memorandum are based on Mr. Marshall's talk to the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (see attached excerpts of student comments on his talk), questions received in the last few months in OTR/SIWA from the Intelligence Community Staff which relate to requests from Mr. Marshall, and Mr. Marshall's questions and comments during my briefing on OTR on 14 July. It is also based on consultation with several SIWA faculty members.

2. As a member of the NSC Intelligence Committee's working group, Mr. Marshall's main interest is in improving finished intelligence so that it better meets the needs of the policy maker. Within this major interest, one of Mr. Marshall's concerns is to develop superior analytical capabilities in the Intelligence Community. He asked what training we are giving on the analytical process, and wants to encourage research on the analytical process. For example, he asked me what I would do if I had \$1 million to use for research on the analytical process. In this connection, the Intelligence Community Staff asked SIWA what training we give analysts in detecting deception in statements of government leaders. This question is apparently related to Mr. Marshall's study of intelligence produced on the Indo-Pakistan crisis.

3. Another of Mr. Marshall's concerns is what he feels is the low level or lack of research on how the Soviet leadership arrives at its decisions. He feels we ought to be able to draw on the universities, where there is teaching on the decision-making process. It may be noteworthy that, in early 1967, when the Air Force was reducing its research contracts, Mr. Marshall's former employer, RAND, approached CIA in the hope of obtaining a contract to do research on the Soviet decision-making process. Mr. Marshall mentioned the usefulness of DDI Research Staff's [ ] series. He may have had in mind particularly the history of Soviet involvement in Egypt which Mr. Kissinger read and appreciated.

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SUBJECT: Andrew Marshall's Major Interests in Intelligence

4. In his talk to the AIS Mr. Marshall also stated that there was need for more speculation -- adventuresome guessing -- in finished intelligence. This message was also one of the themes of talks to earlier AIS classes by Robert Osgood from the NSC staff, and therefore probably reflects Mr. Kissinger's position.

5. Perhaps a key question to be raised about Mr. Marshall's expressed interests is: which of these are Mr. Kissinger's views and which are Mr. Marshall's own favorite themes? Some members of the AIS appeared to feel that Mr. Marshall was, at least in part, pressing his own views, rather than presenting guidance to them from Mr. Kissinger.

6. Captain George Pickett, who accompanied Mr. Marshall on his visit to OTR, stressed one theme: that we should encourage our analysts to be more aggressive in getting back to the requester with clarifying questions so that the finished product will be better focussed on the requester's needs.

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HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM  
Director of Training

Att

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

18 July 1972

SUBJECT: Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 9 student critiques  
on presentation by Andrew Marshall

The following comments are excerpts from student critiques submitted upon completion of the Seminar. Those relating to remarks from Andrew Marshall are:

--Most speakers were exceptionally good. "I consider Mr. A. Marshall the least effective--most difficult to follow--of the speakers."

--"Hopefully, the Andy Marshall phenomena is a transitory one that will run its course and eventually disappear."

--"Could Andy Marshall identify an outside speaker to elaborate and give case studies illuminating techniques he espouses?"

--re weakness of course question, "None that I can recall except too much Andy Marshall and apparently everyone is confused when (he) speaks."

25X1A --Most presentations were enjoyable. "I had a little trouble with Messrs. [ ] Marshall, Tweedy, [ ] and Walsh as far as subject matter or the way it was presented." 25X1A

25X1A --"Even though some Agency and Government speakers were on the dull side (e.g. [ ] Walsh, [ ] or a bit inarticulate and hard to pin down (Andy Marshall, [ ]), it is 25X1A instructive to hear them just because of the positions they 25X1A occupy and the programs they're associated with."

--"The person who to me came over worst was Mr. Marshall who wasn't clear on what his problem was nor what to do about it. Yet from the others inputs many Agency people are waiting most impatiently for his report on quality timeliness and impact of our product and what he would suggest we do about it. It must be that he has something which did not come through in his discussion."

-2-

AIS-9, Andrew Marshall student critique comments

--"Neither Davis or Marshall came across."

--"Why not invite D/OSR to address the problems concerning military affairs, which seem to absorb much of the Agency's time and Andy Marshall's interests." --"The students were critical--as a group--of Mr. Marshall, but it is of importance that they now no (sic) more about him and some of his impact on the way that some parts of the Agency go about their work." --"All of the academic types should be retained because of their real contribution to the mind-stretching theme (Maybe Andy Marshall is right!-- Hire consultants)."

--"Marshall - Brains are not enough."

--"(Some comments on speakers--where no comment is given, the speaker is rated as at least OK.) Ed. note: Andrew Marshall assumed to be one of the "at least OK speakers" since he is not mentioned.

--"It would seem more logical to me to have the overview presentations (e.g. "Priorities for the 70's" & "Organizing For the Future") early on in the course--say after Agency Organization--to provide the general background into which subsequent topics (e.g. Andy Marshall) could be woven. As given many fine comprehensive reviews lost their effect because they had been diluted by prior, spotty introduction." --A general listing of speakers...and final sentence, "Others not mentioned contributed significantly to shaping the course, but their individual presentations were not above or below expectations." --Re question, "will course help you professionally", "None other than mentioned above. We even needed Andy Marshall--without him, all that followed could have been lost. (Would you believe a panel made up of [redacted] & Andy Marshall?)

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--"Andy Marshall was a rather confused and confusing individual but should be retained as long as he is of much significance to so many high level Agency officials."

And finally,

--"The most disturbing speaker in my opinion was Andy Marshall. I feel very uneasy about him. He is very difficult to understand but more frightening is what his impact will really be. Nearly all of the Agency speakers mentioned him and many pointed out that when you can unravel what he says, he does make some sense. What his actual role in though is not clear yet and I have the feeling he will be either a big influence on our production (maybe dangerous) or else he will just fade away."

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Andrew Marshall's Major Interests in Intelligence

FROM:

DTR  
1026, C of C

EXTENSION

NO.

DTR-7744

DATE

19 JUL 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. A DDS  
7D-26, HQ

20 JUL 1972

2.

3. ER  
7E-12, HQ

21 July

4.

5. Ex Dir-Compt  
7D-59, HQ

7/27 7/24

6.

7. D/DCI/IC

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15.

1-5 Would BRANSON  
BE INTERESTED IN THIS?

5-7:  
① OSI has done some  
work on Soviet cybernetics  
which would perhaps  
be relevant to Mr. M's  
thesis

② Suggest pass to  
DDI for info

Any forwarded  
to DDI on 9/19/72

PA

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7. The discussion relating to what might be done to improve the situation was quite general, and this is obviously something I would like to think more about before I make specific proposals to you.

25X1B 8. On the matter of [redacted]

[redacted] Andy indicated he was soliciting reactions from Far Eastern specialists on the NSC staff before he sends the paper to Dr. Kissinger. He said that in the past Dr. Kissinger had expressed keen interest in the [redacted] prepared by CIA, and this latest effort by [redacted] has been requested by Andy to see if such an assessment could be made a more pointed operational document of direct help to persons who have to deal with key foreign officials. Andy plans to send a copy of the new study to Dr. Kissinger along with one of the earlier [redacted] studies to see if Dr. Kissinger considers the new study an improvement. Andy is still a bit uncertain as to how well [redacted] study fits Dr. Kissinger's operational needs.

(signed) [redacted]

Chief, PRG/IC

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The above extracted from Memo for Mr. Tweedy from [redacted] 7 Dec 72,  
Subj: Andy Marshall's Unhappiness with Study Projects (filed NSCIC WG Projects-B

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27 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bronson Tweedy  
D/DCI/IC

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A copy of the first   
prepared at the request of Mr. Andrew Marshall is forwarded  
for your information.



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72-2243

DDI-149272

DD/S 72-2007

18 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

Bill:

Last Friday [ ] and Dr. Post talked to me about Dr. Post's discussion with Mr. Andrew Marshall, Net Assessment Group, NSC Staff. His meeting with Mr. Marshall was a follow-on to an earlier meeting [ ] had with Mr. Marshall at the request of [ ]. Both meetings are described in the attached memos for the record.

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These papers are forwarded not only because Mr. Marshall indicated a plan to be in touch with you but also because the substance of the discussions would appear to require serious Agency attention. The limited Agency test technical expertise is fragmented, a fact which also needs consideration if any overall focus is given to the human side of decision-making and analysis.

We suggest a discussion with [ ] and Post after you have had an opportunity to consider these papers.

25X1A

[ ]  
John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

25X1A

Atts - 2

cc: Mr. Tweedy

SECRET

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

16 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andy Marshall on 5 May 1972

1. [REDACTED] 25X1A  
and I met for an hour on 5 May 1972 with Mr. Andrew Marshall of the National Security Council in his office in the Executive Office Building. The meeting, at his invitation, followed earlier inquiries Mr. Marshall had made of [REDACTED] 25X1A  
25X1A [REDACTED] C/Product Review Group/DCI/IC, as to who in the Agency might be knowledgeable about the intellectual processes which an intelligence analyst goes through in the production of finished intelligence. Referred to us by [REDACTED] 25X1A  
25X1A Mr. Marshall had called me to discuss the subject, and our phone conversation led to this meeting.


2. The broader context of this discussion includes two central facts: (a) Andy Marshall, one of Mr. Henry Kissinger's top aides, was brought to Washington by Kissinger (so Marshall told us) specifically to seek ways of improving the intelligence process and the intelligence product, and (b) the efforts of [REDACTED] group toward these ends are of particular and specific concern to Marshall. Since PSS is in the midst of discussions with [REDACTED] and his group about possible research approaches to these problems, this meeting was a timely opportunity to learn at first hand something of the perspective of a key figure in this area. 25X1A

3. Marshall's specific inquiry, it turns out, stems from a personal feeling that the intelligence analyst's conclusions are affected by a set of implicit assumptions which, if made explicit and examined, would often be found wanting. One implication is that developing methods of identifying such assumptions could be a fruitful avenue for seeking improvement of the intelligence product. Marshall has some awareness of current psychological/mathematical research on decision making processes, and recognizes the relevance of this work to his concerns. We indicated an intention to look into this area, as well as others, and pointed out that we had discussed with [REDACTED] the possibility 25X1A

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andy Marshall on 5 May 1972

of examining very closely the steps which an analyst goes thru in doing his job. We emphasized that we were just beginning to explore what might be done, and that nothing was underway yet. He spoke encouraging words and wished us well.

4. At the beginning of our talk, after we had identified our place and function in CIA, Marshall asked if we were 25X1B



12 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Andrew Marshall of the National Security Council

A 1. During the conversation with [redacted] Mr. Marshall indicated to [redacted] that Dr. Kissinger had asked him to look further into the matter of [redacted]

25X1A

25X1B

[redacted] indicated to Mr. Marshall that the project was under the auspices of a different staff and referred him to me.

25X1A

2. I met with Mr. Marshall for several hours on 10 May. The initial aspect of the conversation was concerned [redacted]

25X1B

[redacted] I indicated to him that it was not fully clear to us whether these were in keeping with the needs of the consumer, and Mr. Marshall indicated he would attempt to get some feedback as to the usefulness of the studies and would also provide guidance [redacted]

25X1B

3. The second portion of our conversation was concerned with a more general theme of particular interest to Mr. Marshall. He feels quite strongly that decision making is not nearly so rational as much of the analysis would make it. When we speak of "the Soviet government feels this way," or "in response to pressures from the left, it is likely that the Chinese government will," this does not represent the way decisions get made. Decision making is not a rational process and cannot be rationally analyzed. Rather, it is the outcome of competing power groups and different strains and factions. The conversation proceeded in a rather stimulating way, as this was congruent with some of my own feelings concerning the influence of individual personalities upon decision making. He indicated in general that he felt it would be quite important for an increased input to be made into analysis of foreign policy decision making by individuals with a perspective on the behavioral sciences who could bring into their analysis

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-2-

small group psychology, social psychology, sociology, etc. In the context of making these remarks, he made note of the fact that he had already been in touch with the DDI concerning a particular project, the [ ] which attempted to follow this model, he would be talking to other Agency officials in general, and he hoped soon to meet with Mr. Colby to discuss some of his views on this matter.



25X1A

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>Executive Director-Comptroller</i>		
ROOM NO. 7-D-59	BUILDING Headquarters	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>② DDI -</i>  <i>I suggest</i>  <i>that your new</i>  <i>staff might join</i>  <i>in a piece of this</i>  <i>action</i></p> <p><i>③ E x D.</i></p>		
FROM: Deputy Director for Support		
ROOM NO. 7-D-26	BUILDING Headquarters	
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		
(47)		

25X1A

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
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<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	DDI - [redacted]		22 May 64	[redacted]	
2	Ex Dir				
3					
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6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
Ex Dir				5/19	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

I have at last been able to schedule a meeting  
for you with [REDACTED]

- re our relations with Andy Marshall.  
It's on your calendar for 3:30 tomorrow, Tuesday  
18 July.

[REDACTED]  
17 July  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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9 November 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR: IC Staff

SUBJECT: Intelligence Contingency Planning

1. The Director has reported that at the most recent WSAG meeting Dr. Kissinger made it very clear that he was speaking for the President directly in making the point that the President anticipates a major intelligence effort in Southeast Asia once the Vietnam hostilities are halted. He is particularly concerned with violations of the truce agreement and he wants to be in a position to know what is happening and to take counter action. The Director has asked everybody to "put their backs into this job." In the immediate future this could mean support to a set of interagency committees generally presided over by George Carver, which are working on very tight deadlines. The thrust of all of this is to plan for how we can meet a major commitment rather than what was obviously thought to be the name of the game before, i.e., fitting what we have into a smaller package. (I don't believe that this implies great increases in planning figures, however).

2. I suggested that, although recognizing the first thrust is on now, the DCI might want to discuss the matter with the USIB next week. He will plan to do so.

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Thomas A. Parrott  
Acting D/DCI/IC

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BS

29 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy, D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Status of NSC Staff Comments on MBFR Needs

1. Reference is my attached memorandum, "Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR," dated 11 August, and your comments of 29 August as to any follow-up.

2. Andy advises me that he talked with Mr. Odeen a week ago and Odeen promised to prepare some comments which he and Andy could discuss, and from this they would decide how to proceed. Andy has not heard further from Odeen.

3. In Andy's words, "The project is alive but not moving."

4. I agree with your comment: "Would also suggest DDI (eventually OSR) and ONE should be involved," but I don't see any basis for even discussing this with them until some word is forthcoming from Odeen.

[Redacted Signature]

Chief, PRG/IC

25X1A

SECRET

11 August 1972

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR

1. On 10 August, Andy Marshall telephoned to say Mr. O'Deen and Mr. Merritt, NSC staff members charged with MBFR matters, had expressed concern to him that the data base needed for MBFR problems did not "seem to be in good shape." He said they would like to see a study made which would assess the data base quality and recommend actions which should be taken to improve it in order to support future MBFR negotiations. He wondered if this might not be a good task for the NSCIC Working Group. I agreed to talk about this with Andy that evening.

2. I had dinner with Andy the evening of 10 August, at which time he said he had also been in contact with colonels on the Joint Staff who also expressed concern that no one seemed to be in charge of developing the intelligence needed for MBFR problems. My suggestion was that if there were really these kinds of concern in the NSC Staff and JCS, these intelligence consumers should provide the intelligence community with a statement which would specifically indicate what was needed from intelligence to support MBFR negotiations, the points on which it was expected good intelligence would be particularly critical, and the degree of uncertainty in basic information which could be accepted without harm to the U.S. negotiating position. I insisted a clear statement of needs was what was required rather than a general question on "how good is your data base?"

3. On 11 August, Andy telephoned to say he had talked to Mr. O'Deen who was skeptical as to what such a statement might accomplish but thought it might be useful. He preferred, however, to wait until after 18 August, by which time both CIA and DIA were to have provided responses to earlier questions posed by Mr. O'Deen. Andy was not aware what these questions covered.

4. Andy said Mr. O'Deen and he felt that since formally going to the DCI with respect to their needs for information to support MBFR negotiations would require involving Mr. Kissinger, they would prefer to avoid the time delays this would create. I suggested that since the questions would be dealing with community responses, there was no reason why either Mr. O'Deen or Marshall could not address their communications to Mr. Tweedy or, if they chose, to me.

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/PRG/IC

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR  
11 August 1972

IC/PRG/ [ ] (11 August 1972)

Distribution:

Orig - PRG Subject/

① - Mr. Tweedy

1 - [ ] chrono

1 - PRG Chrono

Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

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### OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Tweedy		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**

1-3: Has there been any follow up to this? Would also suggest DDI (eventually PSR) & ONE should be involved.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

DATE	

29 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy, D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Status of NSC Staff Comments on MBFR Needs

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3. In Andy's words, "The project is alive but not moving."

4. I agree with your comment: "Would also suggest DDI (eventually OSR) and ONE should be involved," but I don't see any basis for even discussing this with them until some word is forthcoming from Odeen.

[Redacted]  
Chief, PRG/IC

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[Redacted]  
Distribution:

25X1A

orig - addressee

1 - PRG subject

1 - [Redacted]

1 - PRG chrono

11 August 1972

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR

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O/PRG/IC

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR  
11 August 1972

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IC/PRG/[ ](11 August 1972)

Distribution:

Orig - PRG Subject/

5X1A

1 - Mr. Tweedy

1 - [ ] chrono

1 - PRG Chrono

Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

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29 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy, D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: DCI Organization for SALT Verification

1. This memorandum is based on an idea generated by [ ] with which I concur. The basic thesis is that because of the responsibilities which will attach to the DCI for verification under the SALT agreements, and because of the political sensitivity of the matter, the DCI should establish special institutional and evaluative arrangements to handle the problem.

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2. The following is proposed for your consideration and, if you agree with the concept, discussion with the DCI:

a. A DCI Special Representative for SALT Verification be appointed and made chairman of a new USIB SALT Verification Committee. (Instead of "Special Representative" the title can be Assistant, or Advisor, or something similar.) The verification programs are going to involve more than one agency and the designation of a representative within a single organization, such as CIA, would not be adequate.

b. The DCI Special Representative for SALT Verification be provided a staff of two to five analysts, plus administrative assistance, and be authorized to request and receive support from community components as the situation requires. His charter and terms of reference should make it clear that he is to keep the DCI advised as to all matters relating to verification.

3. It would be the responsibility of the Special Assistant for SALT Verification to maintain a complete awareness of national level consumer needs for verification, and to evaluate the capabilities of community collection, processing and production resources to respond to such needs.

4. Some parts of the verification problem now come under the aegis of committees such as COMIREX and GMAIC, and various other elements of the intelligence community have studied aspects of the problem, but -- as we in PRG/IC view the situation -- the existing arrangements do not provide the centralization of responsibility, the direct recognition of the overall importance of the problem area and the single-center focus of knowledge which the DCI probably is going to require.

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Chief, PRG/IC

REF ID: A66001133A000900030001-6

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Tweedy		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>1-3: I think att'd. overstates  <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 30px; display: inline-block;"></div> suggestions. Pls  return the att'd.  <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 80px; height: 30px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 100px;"></div></p> <p>3-4- INFO-85</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 60px; margin-top: 10px;"></div>			
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FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

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25X1A

Extract from [redacted] MOR of 15 June 1972, Subj: Conference  
with Andrew Marshall

6. With respect to Bill Hyland's proposal that collectors could list their problem areas and submit these to top level consumers for guidance, I again reiterated to Andy that the contact should be between production organizations and consumers rather than have collectors working with consumers. I told him it was not my intention in the memorandum of 16 May to limit this consumer/producer contact to formal written statements, and I recognized the need for two-way communication and feedback.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO 

25X1

FROM:

A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

SUBJECT:

Further Thoughts on Obtaining Guidance

This is in response to your memorandum of 16 May. While I have some problems with Bill Hyland's proposal as it finally emerged, I do feel that the general notion of having people in the community prepare materials to which top level decisionmakers or their staff can respond is an important communication device.

It seems to me that the view you expressed as to how consumers should express their needs raises a number of problems. First, all studies of communication processes within large organizations or between organizations suggest that they do not and cannot work very well if structured as you appear to suggest. For one thing it is very difficult for anyone trying to communicate something to do so completely and fully in one statement. What usually happens is that the first communication is approximate, and refinements take place in response to queries from the presumed recipients of the message, or there are other feedback mechanisms that produce successive adjustments in the guidance. While formal descriptions of how organizations operate tend to follow logical structures of the sort you outline, studies of how they really function show them to be more cybernetic, with lots of two-way communication, redundancy, and feedback. At least that is how communication actually takes place, when it occurs.

In any event clear-cut separation and one way, once for all communication from consumers to producers, as you appear to suggest, can only lead, I believe, to poor communication. It will leave us where

we are now. Just as another comment, it would seem to me that the collectors would not really know how to make the most appropriate tradeoffs without a continuing interaction with the ultimate consumers. How are details and nuances in consumer needs communicated and taken into account by collectors? Also we will need to separate consideration of several decision processes and guidance to them. For example, in an earlier memo I suggested we need to separate planning for the next five years, allocating resources for the current budget year, and day to day assignment processes.

A second general observation I would make is that people often find it easier to respond to a specific question, or to a position of someone else, than they do to generate a complete expression of their own thoughts.

Let's get together and discuss this when you get back.

DCI/IC-72-0389/1

16 May 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Andrew Marshall, NAG/NSC Staff

SUBJECT : Bill Hyland's Suggestion for Obtaining Guidance

1. Reference is your memorandum of 9 May 1972, subject as above, in which you outlined Bill Hyland's proposal for solicitation of advice and guidance from top level people to the intelligence community.
2. In my view, there is a basic flaw in his proposal--in that he would be establishing a direct link between collectors and consumers, whereas the links actually should be consumer-to-producer and producer-to-collector. It is the producer who tasks the collector, not the consumer.
3. The problem basically is one of improving the means and channels by which consumer needs are expressed to the producing agencies. From then on the problem is internal to the intelligence community, with the producers being cognizant of what is in the files, what needs updating, where the gaps are, what the capabilities of the various collectors are, etc.
4. The producers are knowledgeable from experience as to what the collection organizations can and cannot do, what they like to collect and what, conversely, they may not like to collect.
5. I agree with you that "we want to experiment with a number of ways of communicating across the intelligence community/consumer interface" and that "we need to try to experiment and try to find ways that make it easy, or at least easier, for the consumer representatives to give guidance if we are going to align the focus of the intelligence community upon those questions and those issues that the consumers are most concerned about."
6. What the consumer is interested in--or should be--however, is the product. He should give his guidance by indicating, as clearly as possible, the kinds of product he wants, when he wants it, and the issues he wants to have addressed. I have difficulty understanding how this end result can be helped along by having a group of consumers reviewing collection problems.

7. It may be there is something in Bill's proposal that I don't clearly understand, but, frankly, I don't really think this is an avenue we should pursue.

8. I am going to be out of town for three weeks, but will be in touch with you as soon as I get back.



25X1

Chief, PRG/IC

5X1A IC/PRG/[redacted] (16 May 72)

Distribution:

Orig - Addse

1 - ~~Mr. Tweedy~~

1 - [redacted] Chrono

1 - PRG Subject/*filed Product Improvement - 2*

1 - PRG Chrono

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<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	MR TWEEDY		
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3		<i>May</i>	
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>SINCE I AM SAYING "NO" TO ANDY MARSHALL IN THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR YOU TO SEE MY REPLY AND BE AWARE OF IT BEFORE I DISPATCHED IT.</p> <p>ANDY'S MEMO TO ME OF 9 MAY ALSO IS ATTACHED.</p> <p><i>1-3: Appreciatively and think you have put it very well. This is a new starter &amp; page 7 is almost too kind!</i></p>			
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		NO.	DATE
			16 May 72
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
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MEMORANDUM

DCI/IC -72-0389

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO

[Redacted]

25X1

FROM:

A. W. MARSHALL *AWM*

SUBJECT:

Report on Bill Hyland's Suggestion for obtaining Guidance

A few days ago I had a discussion with Bill Hyland regarding his proposal for solicitation of advice and guidance from top level people to the community. What he appears to have in mind is the following:

1. That several or each of the major collection organizations draw up by area, by function, a list of things it can collect and provide, and things that it cannot or does not want to provide. These organizations could include the clandestine services, the defense attaché effort, NSA, NRO, etc.
2. These statements should indicate what they think they should and should not be doing and offer collectors an opportunity to shed dreary tasks that no one currently cares about.
3. Who is to review these statements? Basically some sort of consumer working group involving the White House, NSC, State, Defense, but the consumer working group should include not only representatives of the consumers but representatives of the top intelligence analysts and producers.

His feeling is that such a listing probably would show some areas where a good deal of effort is going on that no one really cares about, or at least not very much. On the other hand it would make clear that there are certain things that are not now being done that are of real interest. A discussion could be generated as to how particular kinds of information

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might in fact be collected. The listings, or the discussions, should also get into what is coming along the pike, what new technologies, new collection programs are already entrain that will open up new kinds of information sources. This dialogue between the collectors and the consumer working group, therefore, would involve aspects of planning ahead, taking into account what is going to open up so that people could get ready to exploit the new collection that is planned, but also that one could discuss new sorts of data that would be of special interest.

Bill Hyland indicated that he really had not thought through the whole thing in detail, for example, the exact nature of consumer working group, nor of precisely what it is the collectors should try to supply as a description of what they are doing. The description would have to be in some kind of summary form so as not to totally overload the communication between the collector and the reviewing group, but still it would have to have a lot of significant detail in it. It is possible that one could try to do an experiment in one particular area using the NSCIC working group as the review group. With appropriate material in hand from a major collection in a specific area, we might see whether in fact it is true that there are tasks that people are grinding away at that the organization would like to drop and are of low priority.

When Bill first spoke to me about it I thought he had in mind something a little less comprehensive than this kind of review. I thought that what he had in mind was that in particular cases or on particular key decisions the collectors might be able to define and focus the issues involved, the options that they were having to chose amongst, and their views as to the consequences in terms of information collected and put this up for consideration, and the issuance of guidance, by representatives of the consumers.

In any case as I told you at lunch several days ago, I do think we want to experiment with a number of ways communicating across the intelligence community/consumer interface. In particular we need to try to experiment and try to find ways that make it easy, or at least easier, for the consumer representatives to give guidance if we are going to align the focus of the intelligence community upon those questions and those issues that the consumers are most concerned about.

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY



Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

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10 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy  
SUBJECT : NIS Program

1. Reference is the draft memorandum for the DCI, "National Intelligence Survey Program--Progress Report on Proposal to Phase Out Detailed Sections," dated 17 April 1972, which John Kerry King, Director, OBGI, sent to Ed Proctor, and which Ed forwarded to you with a note that he did not intend to send it to the DCI. Instead, Ed was instructing King to proceed on his planned course of action in the NIS committee.

2. Ed sent the papers to you for information, with the suggestion you take no action on the matter. You passed the papers to me last week.

3. I concur with Ed, since the issues seem to be within the competence of the NIS committee to handle. The objections thus far stated have come from the military services. If, as the NIS committee acts, the service concern is then expressed at a higher level then IC action may be called for--but not before.

4. I personally think the proposed changes are good, and the beefed-up General Survey sections should handle most needs for basic intelligence. Given the resource constraints, I see no other direction NIS can go other than to cut back on the scope of the project.

5. Since any follow-on would relate to PRG responsibilities, I am keeping King's memorandum on file.

Chief, PRG/IC

IC/PRG/ (10 May 72)

Distribution:

Orig - Mr. Tweedy


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28 April 1972


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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Altering NIS Program

1. I would agree with Proctor that Mr. Tweedy need take no action with respect to subject progress report on grounds that no issue has arisen which is beyond the competence of the NIS Committee to handle. If Service complaints were raised at a higher level there might be a role for the IC in resolving the complaints.

2. Personally, I applaud the changes in the NIS program which Jack King is making. Much of the detailed NIS writing was geared to contingency planning, most of which has now gone beyond the pale of realism. Thus, the beefing up of the General Survey sections should handle most needs for basic intelligence. If Mr. Tweedy is asked to comment on the relationship of King's changes to intelligence policy, he should say there are compatible both with product improvement efforts and cost consciousness.




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IC/PRG/ (28 Apr 72)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC ☐

Bronson--

Attached is a status report on Jack King's efforts to rationalize the NIS program. I have decided not to send this to the Director because it requires no action on his part. I have told King this and have instructed him to proceed with his planned course of action in the NIS Committee. I am sending you these papers for your information. I suggest that you take no action on this matter.

☐  
Ed Proctor

26 April 1972  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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DDI/IC-72-0330

17 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Survey Program  
-- Progress Report on Proposal to  
Phase Out Detailed Sections

REFERENCE : Memo to DCI, dated 10 September 1971,  
Subject: National Intelligence Survey  
Program -- Assessment and Plans

1. The referenced memorandum (Attachment A) outlined a number of changes under way or planned for the General Survey and the reasons for them. All the changes mentioned have been made or are in process of implementation, including a new format and cover (Attachment B), and a shift to a bound-by-chapter arrangement scheduled to appear about 1 July 1972. The changes made and in process have received widespread favorable response.

2. The referenced memorandum also made the following two recommendations:

a. that the detailed supplements on the Armed Forces of Communist China and the USSR be discontinued at the end of FY '72 and that carefully selected essential data from them be integrated into the Armed Forces chapter of the General Survey in its new format, and

b. that the remaining detailed sections be dropped from the program at the end of FY '72.

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declassification

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3. The reasons for the recommendations were the continuing manpower and budget attrition in DIA which was eroding production to the point of marginal return, the limited audience for several of the sections remaining in production, some areas of overlap between the General Survey and the detailed sections, and the need to accommodate a directed personnel strength reduction in the NIS Division of OBGI.

4. With respect to the recommendations, you instructed me to proceed with the necessary staff work and coordination with the NIS Committee of USIB. That has been a slow process because of the worldwide survey of the matter conducted by the armed services representatives and because of the complexity of the issues involved. However, the NIS Committee Members have now responded (Attachment C). DIA and State agree to my proposal to eliminate the detailed supplements and to expand selectively the General Survey. The Army representative reported approval in general, but recorded the desires of several specific users for continuation of certain supplements. He also expressed concern with the trend away from the original concepts and goals of the NIS program. The Navy response opposes any change that reduces coverage of interest to the Navy. Some of the Navy-stated requirements can be met adequately in the new format, but the Oceanography section presents problems. I am attempting to reach agreement on the basis of continuing publication through FY '73. The Air Force representative reported general acceptance of the proposal, requested that certain specific data be incorporated into the new General Survey format, most of which we can accomplish, and underscored a "need for assurance that any reduction of hard-cover production by any one of the intelligence-producing agencies be assessed at the national level."

5. Despite the reluctance and concern expressed by the armed services representatives, I see no reason to alter the recommendations. Most of the publications mentioned by the armed services representatives are produced by DIA and, because of budget and personnel reductions in DIA, are already scheduled for elimination or reduction in scope and maintenance cycles to the point where continuing them as separate publications seems an uneconomic use of resources. The expressed concerns of the armed services representatives have been given careful consideration in reviewing the proposal to phase out the detailed sections. Attachment D briefly recaps, for each detailed section, the main factors involved, what I propose to do, and the rationale in each case. I believe that we can eliminate the detailed sections and still meet the broad basic intelligence needs of most of the NIS audience.

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6. The matter has now been placed before the NIS Committee for approval and the draft memorandum to USIB (Attachment E) offered for coordination before submitting it to USIB.




JOHN KERRY KING

Director

Basic and Geographic Intelligence  
and

Chairman, NIS Committee

Attachments:

- A: Referenced memorandum
- B: Sample of new General Survey cover 
- C: Responses from NIS Committee Members
- D: Summary of Review of Detailed Sections
- E: Draft memorandum to USIB

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ATTACHMENT A


10 September 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Survey Program  
-- Assessment and Plans

A

1. A year ago, I was given responsibility for management of the National Intelligence Survey program. I have formed some opinions concerning the program and its future, and I have initiated a number of changes in the product. In view of the nature of some of the thoughts I want to express to you on the subject, this informal memorandum seems appropriate.
2. The NIS program publishes the oldest national intelligence product, and the NIS Committee is the oldest of the USIB committees. From the beginning the NIS story has been one of overly ambitious goals and limited or shrinking resources. The original goal was up-to-date, worldwide, detailed coverage, encyclopedic in scope, that would satisfy all interagency requirements for basic intelligence. The program has never come close to achieving its original goals.
3. Early emphasis in the NIS was on intelligence related to the needs of the 1940's when the conduct of military operations and of military government in many areas were major national activities. In the mid-1960's heavy requirements were added to meet an instant national passion for counterinsurgency. The content was largely descriptive, but, gradually, more sophisticated political, economic, and sociological data and analysis crept into NIS publications.
4. Throughout its history the NIS program has been under critical scrutiny, and despite the weight of its original philosophical and organizational rationale, there has been change. The trends have been toward more realistic identification of goals and the matching of goals to resources. Universal coverage was rejected in favor of concentration on priority areas. Time cycles for updating were lengthened. The General Survey became the centerpiece of the

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program, reducing the emphasis on detail, and the publication of several detailed sections was discontinued. The tendencies inherent in those changes have yet to run their full course.

5. The NIS has often been at cross-purposes with itself, seeking to be both an encyclopedic data base and a useful orientation reference for high-level planners and policymakers. Discerning a proper audience and capturing it has always posed a dilemma for the managers of the NIS program. On the one hand, there has never been, nor is there likely to be, sufficient resources allocated to create and to maintain the kind of worldwide, on-shelf, up-to-date data base essential to operational planning, as was originally conceived. On the other hand, the high-level, generalist reader finds the NIS too burdensomely detailed for his purposes. The General Survey has emerged as a compromise.

6. But I find that the General Survey lacks internal integrity. And it has never solved its identity crisis. The quality of research, analysis, and writing within a given volume varies widely. There is unnecessary overlap and lack of balance among its various chapters. For years, the volume has been written to an elaborate and detailed formula, set down in the Standard Instructions, and it has become increasingly and excessively wooden and dull.

7. Except for the uneven quality of the inputs, most of the above-listed shortcomings can be corrected by aggressive and enlightened editing. Historically, NIS editors have been instructed to lay very light hands on contributions. They were conditioned to be processors. The NIS editors now are under a different set of instructions; they are charged with being editors in the broad, irascible and honorable manner of the art.

8. A series of changes in the General Survey have been initiated. My intent is to reshape the book gradually so that the volumes emerging during FY 72 will be markedly different from their predecessors. The General Survey will aim directly and consciously at readers seeking broad, basic information and analysis, and general orientation and reference. The General Survey of Algeria, published in June 1971, was the first to begin incorporating the changes. The volume on  published in late July, is a further refinement and a better book. General Surveys published since have continued the pattern.

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The changes in the General Survey include:

a. An annotated Table of Contents to help the reference reader.

b. Heretofore, the Introduction was a compilation of sentences culled from various chapters and strung together. It is now replaced by a short, independent essay on the major trends or dynamics that characterize the country. My intent is that the Introduction open the book with style and class.

c. Chapter 2, written by DIA and stressing military geography, is moved to the rear of the volume where it does not interrupt the story line. In its place, Geography Division of OCGI contributes a short, culturally oriented geographic lead into the Sociological, Political, and Economic chapters.

d. Photographs and graphics are being subjected to a new and rigorous review for substantive usefulness and reproduction quality. Data of primary interest for reference or planning purposes are presented in tabular form to the extent possible.

e. Subject matter of primary interest to military readers is now brought together in a final chapter called Military Factors.

f. Two parts of the program deal with cultural and sociological topics. The Land and People Chapter of the General Survey (30 per year) is written in OGI. A Social Characteristics detailed section (10-12 per year) is written by a contract group in the Department of Commerce. The two overlap to an undesirable degree. During the third quarter of FY 72, the separate Social Characteristics publication will be phased out and the contract group in Commerce will begin producing sociological chapters for the General Survey. Production will be coordinated with OGI to take advantage of the best available talent in each.

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g. During the latter part of the current fiscal year, I propose to begin producing the General Survey in a bound-by-chapter format. (Annex A shows the chapter breakdown.) This format will have several advantages. It permits the updating of given chapters -- Economic or Government and Politics, for example -- without having to revise and reprint the entire General Survey volume. It permits selective and more efficient dissemination and filing practices. And it avoids publication of overly bulky and unwieldy single volumes.

h. At changeover to the bound-by-chapter format, a new first chapter, called the Country Profile, will be initiated. This short study will be designed especially for the high level reader seeking a quick orientation and comprehension. (Annex B is a mock-up of the Country Profile.)

9. Thus far, I have discussed the NIS task from the point of view of consolidating a disparate program and of improving its utility and quality. To cope with current and anticipated pressures on budget and manpower in the intelligence community, I also propose a number of changes that will reduce the research, reproduction, and manpower costs of the NIS program. The proposed changes are based on the assumption that the development and maintenance of a strong, high quality and broadly useful national basic intelligence program, based entirely on the General Survey, would serve the government well and would be within the resources of the intelligence community. Such a program would provide a coordinated, basic reference source, and a general orientation and country familiarization publication. It would also maintain the essential foundation and structure to meet any future requirement for an expanded national basic intelligence research and production effort.

10. To accomplish the above, I recommend:

a. that the detailed supplements on the Armed Forces of Communist China and the USSR be discontinued at the end of FY 72 and that carefully selected and essential subject matter contained in them be integrated into the Military Affairs chapter of the General Survey.

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b. that the remaining detailed sections be dropped from the NIS program at the end of FY 72. Some of them are of very limited use; and a number are being produced at the rate of only one or two per year. Serious thought must be given to identification of especially and widely useful data in the detailed sections that could be integrated into the General Survey in less detailed form. (Annex C lists and appraises briefly the detailed sections scheduled for FY 72.)

11. To assist me in rethinking and reshaping the NIS program, I have organized an NIS Policy Advisory Panel of the following senior intelligence line officers -- [redacted] David E. Mark (INR), Richard Lehman (OCI), [redacted] (OER), and [redacted] (DDP). The enlightened commentary and suggestions from members of the panel have helped me in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the program, in identifying its proper audience, and in planning what I believe to be a feasible and broadly useful program for the future. However, the observations and proposals contained in this memorandum are my own and have not been formally reviewed or endorsed by the Panel. Neither has the memorandum been reviewed by the NIS Committee. I seek first to find if this assessment and plan of action is in accordance with your sense of the situation.

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✓ JOHN KERRY KING  
Director  
Basic and Geographic Intelligence  
and  
Chairman, NIS Committee

**Attachments:**

- Annex A: Proposed new Format for the General Survey
- Annex B: Mock-up of a Country Profile
- Annex C: NIS Detailed Sections Scheduled for FY 72

**Distribution:**

- O&I - DCI
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - Ch/ED/BGI
- 2 - D/BGI

D/BGI:JKKing: [redacted] (9 September 1971)

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

ATTACHMENT C

RESPONSES FROM NIS COMMITTEE MEMBERS

C

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declassification



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

8 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NIS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Survey Program -  
Assessment and Plans.

I refer to your memorandum of 10 September 1971 to the Director of Central Intelligence. We have reviewed the changes and recommendations therein and are confident that the resulting General Surveys will contain sufficient detail to satisfy the needs of almost every conceivable State reader. Should some specialist happen to require yet more basic facts on some narrow topic, we are also sure that such material will be available either elsewhere in the intelligence community or in public print.

This memorandum thus is designed to express the Department's concurrence in the revised program and to reconfirm our continuing desire to maintain the support role that we play at present.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "A. Sidney Buford III".

A. Sidney Buford III  
State Member  
NIS Committee

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500030001-6  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 FEB 1972

C-0066/DI-1A

Subject: Proposed Changes in National Intelligence Survey (NIS)  
Program (U)

To: Chairman, National Intelligence Survey Committee  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

1. (U) Reference your memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 10 September 1971, subject: National Intelligence Survey Program--Assessment and Plans.
2. (C) This Agency agrees to your proposal to eliminate the detailed supplements of the NIS program at the end of FY 72 and to incorporate selected data from these sections in the General Survey. Expansion of the General Survey should be pursued on a selective basis, by country and subject, as the need arises.
3. (C) Review of the detailed supplements currently in work reveals several that are scheduled for delivery during the first half of FY 1973 and should be considered for publication by CIA.
  - a. The section 23, Weather and Climate, on NIS 85/86/95, scheduled for delivery in July 1972, is now approximately 50 percent completed.
  - b. The following units, scheduled for delivery as indicated, would complete coverage for the respective areas:

(1) [ ] This unit has been completed through CIA edit; however, further production has been suspended pending receipt of new source materials needed to resolve reference material differences.

(2) [ ] General Urban Map, July and September 1972, respectively.

(3) [ ] November 1972.

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(4) NIS 43C, Section 35, Ports and Naval Facilities,  
Minor Ports, July 1972.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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DIA



Assistant Deputy Director for  
Intelligence (Programmed Intelligence)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

7 FEB 1972

DAMI-FI

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, NIS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of  
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)

1. (C) At the 12 January 1972 meeting of the NIS Committee, you requested that for the next meeting each Member have prepared a memorandum indicating his Department's position on the subject stated above. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request.
2. (C) The Army Staff and commands -- other than those which are components of Unified Commands -- were informed of the proposed discontinuation of production of detailed sections of the NIS. This was accomplished by forwarding as an inclosure a copy of DIA message, Number 6363 dated 012259Z October 1971. The Army addressees were requested to review the message and advise the OACSI, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence if the proposed changes were acceptable. If the changes were not acceptable, the addressees were requested to submit a statement indicating the adverse impact that the changes would have on their operations.
3. (C) In general, the proposed changes were acceptable to the Army Staff and commands. There were, however, several notable exceptions.
  - a. The US Army Intelligence Command's US Army Imagery Interpretation Center wants Section 24 continued in its present format.
  - b. The Directorate of Military Engineering, Office of the Chief of Engineers indicated that Sections 24, 25, 31, 32, and 33 are of particular value as detailed supplemental sources for area analysis research in support of military topographic mapping.
  - c. The US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) strongly objected to discontinuation of the Armed Forces detailed sections for NIS 26 and NIS 39A, and further questioned the advisability of dropping the detailed sections in the Geography and Transportation and Telecommunications subject areas for NIS 26 and 39A and other high priority areas.

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DAMI-FI

7 FEB 1972

SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of  
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)

d. Of the continental armies, schools, and centers of the U.S. Army Continental Army Command (CONARC), only two objected to the proposed changes. The J. F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center expressed continuing need for in-depth coverage of all aspects of targeted countries in support of deployment and predeployment planning and contingency planning. In the past, the NIS has been used as the basic source document and the reduction would hinder acquisition of the required in-depth knowledge. The Center also recommended that Section 57 (Subversion and Insurgency) be restored to the program since the treatment in the General Survey does not provide adequate in-depth coverage. CONARC's Continental Tactical Intelligence Center (CONTIC) stressed its interest in subjects falling within the Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, and Economy chapters and the sections on Armed Forces and Intelligence and Security. However, CONTIC's concern appeared to stem from the belief that reduction of NIS production meant also that the data base on these subjects would no longer be maintained.

4. (C) a. Apart from the specifics discussed in paragraph 3, above, the undersigned is concerned over a less obvious problem -- that of reducing NIS production at the very time that there is a concurrent reduction of departmental hard-cover production.

b. CIA and DIA are the principal producers of intelligence, i.e., that which is produced as hard-<sup>cover</sup> published intelligence for general distribution to all agencies which have expressed a need for intelligence on the subject or geographic area. DIA has already purged its programmed production of a wide variety of hard-cover products such as the logistical studies, LOC studies, health and sanitation studies, and the like. This action was predicated upon priorities, duplication of other products, and continued coverage in other publications -- the latter two justifications may have referred to NIS coverage which was expected to continue -- e.g., Health and Sanitation Studies vis-a-vis NIS Section 45.

c. It appears that production of programmed hard-cover publications is being phased-out by the producers unilaterally whereas the net total loss in on-the-shelf, hard-cover, published intelligence should first be determined. A cessation of programmed production of a given product may be acceptable so long as there are other publications/products available and programmed for continued production. Conversely, subsequent discontinuation of the latter may create a void so that the user who has come to depend upon published intelligence will find that none is available at the very time he needs it. All too frequently a need arises suddenly, and there is insufficient time to produce, publish, and distribute the intelligence product.

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
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7 FEB 1972

DAMI-FI

SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of  
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)

d. It is the belief of the undersigned that product elimination must be based on a plan coordinated by the producers rather than by unilateral action taken in the name of economy. The net loss of reduced production by the several agencies should be assessed somewhere at the national level to determine the total cumulative loss in the published intelligence inventory. Otherwise, the program runs the risk of creating voids that could be critical in times of crisis or emergency. It is a basic truism that intelligence should be produced before rather than after it is needed. This was the concept that underlay the establishment of the NIS Program.



BRUCE R. GRANT  
Army Member  
NIS Committee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND  
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22314

CONFIDENTIAL  
IN REPLY REFER TO

Ser C150/NIC-34  
Date 7 February 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE

Subj: Proposed Reformatting of National Intelligence Survey (U)

Ref: (a) Dir. OBGi memo to Dir Central Intelligence of 10 Sept 71  
(b) DIA msg 012259Z OCT 1971

1. (C) The Navy position to the proposed reformatting of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) is one of strong opposition unless it will accommodate the comprehensive coverage of naval subjects now included.
2. (C) References (a) and (b) indicate that separate sections containing detailed data will no longer be produced on such subjects as merchant marine, naval ports and facilities, coasts and landing beaches, oceanography and climatology. Besides immediately depriving Navy planners and operational commanders of the most ready source of such information, eliminating the requirement to publish it in the NIS could lead in the long term to atrophy of the whole world-wide maritime data base through lack of emphasis at the national level on collecting and maintaining such information. If anything, we will need greater efforts in this area as the tempo of operations slows and ship visits to many areas of the world become less frequent.
3. (U) The proposals of reference (a) and (b) appear to eliminate that production on the ocean areas of the world. The Naval Oceanographic Office currently compiles and produces Section 2 (Ocean Areas) and Section 7 (Evaluation) of the NIS. These Sections, in addition to being utilized as an input to the NIS, provide information in satisfying other validated requirements assigned to that office. The current format of Section 2 satisfies not only the NIS requirements, but also the requirement for Oceanographic Atlases. Although a part of the NIS, the oceanographic sections, are utilized by many naval interests outside the intelligence community. The Sections provide the only source in this format of environmental information to operational and planning personnel. They serve in lieu of the Oceanographic Atlas Series, discontinued in 1967 as an economy measure.
4. (C) The proposed reduction in scope of the NIS could have

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Ser C150/NIC-34

Date 7 February 1972

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grave affects on the responsiveness and success of fleet operating forces in contingency situations. Despite the advent of automated intelligence systems, the NIS remains the only encyclopedic compendium of world-wide data on the aforementioned subjects of naval interest. It appears that changes to the program outlined in references (a) and (b) might result in cursory treatment of these subjects of naval interest and would completely eliminate other information which could be vital to the success of combat operations.

  
J. J. CRYAN  
CAPT USN

Deputy Commander, Naval  
Intelligence Command

Copy to:

NIS Committee Member Dept of State  
NIS Committee Member DIA  
NIS Committee Member Army  
NIS Committee Member Air Force

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

INAKB

8 February 1972

SUBJECT: Proposed Reductions in NIS Program (C)

TO: Chairman, NIS Committee


1. (C) This letter is submitted pursuant to your request of 12 January for a letter from each NIS Committee Member on his organization's position in regard to subject proposal.

2. (C) Air Force users of NIS products were queried as to the acceptability, from their viewpoint, of the proposed reductions as outlined in DIA message #6363 dated 012259Z October 1971. In general, the responses were that the proposed changes were acceptable. Several users had specific reservations as to the proposal, including:

a. The Electronic Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command wants Section 23 continued in its present format even if consolidated into the General Survey.

b. The Air Force Communications Service wants the substance of Section 36 incorporated into the G.S. or Section 36 continued.

3. (C) In addition to the objections raised in paragraph 2 above, the general position of acceptance of the proposal by the Air Force must be tempered by overall Air Force intelligence requirements. There is a need for assurance that any reduction of hard cover production by any one of the intelligence producing agencies be assessed at the national level. Only by so doing can the community as a whole, and Air Force as a member of that community, avoid the risk of creating gaps in the published intelligence inventory which could be critical to mission requirements in time of crisis.



EVERETT J. BURLANDO  
Air Force Member  
NIS Committee

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY



PRIDE IN THE PAST

FAITH IN THE FUTURE

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ATTACHMENT D

SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF DETAILED SECTIONS

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
7/2/03.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION

NIS coverage plan

The USIB-approved NIS Coverage Plan now in effect is dated 15 March 1968. A few other countries have since been added.

Current production schedule

For each NIS element the 1968 USIB-approved coverage plan indicates an annual production rate intended to provide an adequate revision cycle for the countries requiring coverage under that topic. Lack of resources during recent years has resulted in actual production rates considerably below the planned maintenance rate.

Rankings in user surveys

Two User Surveys are relevant to this study. The first is the 1969 NIS User Survey, in which 30 different NIS products were ranked according to usefulness on the basis of responses from 1,000 users. The second was a DoD User Survey, concluded in June 1970 by the Finished Intelligence Products Review Committee, in which the 131 DIA-produced items in the category of general intelligence -- the category in which NIS products fall -- were ranked.

DCID intelligence priorities

Refers to the priorities assigned in DCID No. 1/2, effective 21 January 1972. Military Geography and Transportation were not divided into the various subtopics that comprise the NIS sections so that some subtopics might be expected to rank higher or lower than the overall subject. A cutoff of priority 6 was established as the break between intelligence of importance and intelligence of interest.

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# PORTS AND NAVAL FACILITIES (Section 35)

Producer: DIA

NIS coverage plan: USSR; China; 6 countries in Eastern

Europe; [REDACTED] 1 in

the Middle East; 3 in Africa; 4 in Latin America

Current production schedule: 9 for FY 72; 3 or 4 for FY 73

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 7th of 30; DoD -- 32nd of 131

DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole)

as related to NIS coverage plan: USSR -- priority 5; 12 countries with priority 6; 5 with priority 7; 1 with priority 8; and 8 unranked. Eleven additional countries not on the coverage plan carry a priority of 6.

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NSC

Proposal: Discontinue Section 35 as a separate study. For those countries having a DCID priority of 5 or 6 and having significant ports, the general coverage provided by the port sheets (now comprising a Section 35) would be retained for inclusion in the General Survey. A few lower priority countries with ports of international significance should also receive fairly comprehensive treatment. For the remaining countries, coverage in the General Survey at its present level of detail would continue. The value of the recent change in format to individual port sheets, as opposed to a single-volume study on all ports, has been established, and such sheets should continue in annex form to the General Survey.

Rationale: There appears little justification for retaining the Section 35 as a disparate entity in the NIS Program when essentially the same coverage can be accommodated in the General Survey. The need for fairly detailed port data has been established and although inclusions of the port sheets will add to the bulk of the General Survey, the coverage should be continued to meet this need.

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## MERCHANT MARINE (Section 36)

Producer: Navy

NIS coverage plan: USSR; China; 5 East European countries.

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Current production schedule: 4 per year

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 27th of 30; DoD -- not ranked

DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole) as related to NIS coverage plan: USSR -- priority 5; 11 countries with priority 6; 3 with priority 7; 1 with priority 8; and 6 unranked. Eight additional countries are ranked 6.

Proposal: Discontinue Section 36. For countries with DCID priority 5 or 6 and for a few others where the merchant marine is particularly important but would not be reflected in the overall category of transportation in the priority listing, the outline for merchant marine in the General Survey would be expanded to include some of the more broadly useful data now in the Section 36.

Rationale: Although of special interest to the Navy, the ranking in the NIS User Survey does not justify continuation as a separate study.

## CIVIL AIR (Section 37)

Producer: DIA

NIS coverage plan: 9 countries owning significant civil air fleets, including the USSR and China

Current production schedule: 1 per year; none for FY 73

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 20th of 30; DoD -- 81st of 131

DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole) as related to NIS coverage plan; USSR -- priority 5; 5 countries with priority 6; 3 with priority 7. Seven additional countries have a priority of 6.

Proposal: Discontinue Section 37. Continue the level of treatment now accorded civil air in the General Survey.

Rationale: DIA seems disinterested in producing the section; recent survey produced no special requests for continuance of the studies beyond a plea to retain transportation data; and much of the material contained therein is available in open sources.

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
## TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Section 38)

Producer: DIA

NIS coverage plan: USSR: China: 7 East European countries;  
[redacted] 1 on the Middle  
East; 6 on Africa; 8 on Latin America

Current production schedule: 12 for FY 72; 4 for FY 73

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 12th of 30; DoD -- 42nd of 131  
DCID intelligence priorities as related to NIS coverage plan:



Proposal: Discontinue Section 38. For all countries with a DCID intelligence priority of 6 or higher, the General Survey outline would be expanded to include the more important aspects of the topic. For all other countries, the present degree of detail in the General Survey would be retained.

Rationale: The telecommunications material in Section 38 is suitable for incorporation into the Terrain, Transportation, and Telecommunications chapter of the General Survey. Communications are assigned a relatively high priority, and the recent survey taken to assess the effect of dropping the Section 38 indicates need for treatment of the subject at a level of detail somewhat higher than is now provided in the General Survey.

## HEALTH AND SANITATION (Section 45)

Producer: DIA

NIS coverage plan: Worldwide

Current production schedule: 12 per year

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 25th of 30; DoD -- 80th of 131

DCID intelligence priority: Topic not ranked

Proposal: Discontinue Section 45.

Rationale: Preliminary results of a recent survey of DIA's medical production indicates that the Surgeon General's needs are not being met by the level of detail contained in the Section 45. It would appear that the type of coverage required can best be produced departmentally by some component of DoD. An overview of the health and sanitation situation is included in the social characteristics discussion in the General Survey, and this seems adequate.

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## INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (Section 56)

Producer: DDP

NIS coverage plan: [REDACTED]

Current production schedule: 9 per year

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 4th of 30; DoD -- not ranked

DCID intelligence priorities: [REDACTED]

Proposal: Discontinue Section 56 as a separate study, but create a new Intelligence and Security chapter to the General Survey for priority countries or when the internal situation dictates.

Rationale: Topic is too important to drop from the program and can be satisfactorily included in the package that comprises the General Survey. Inclusion in the Government and Politics chapter would be infeasible because of the limiting classification/control normally assigned intelligence and security coverage.

## ARMED FORCES (Sections 1 through 7)

Producer: DIA

NIS coverage plan: USSR (includes general discussion and sections on ground, naval, air, air defense, and missile forces, and military space systems); China (includes general discussion and sections on ground, naval, and air forces)

Current production schedule: 1 per year

Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 3rd of 30; DoD -- 15th of 131

DCID intelligence priorities as related to NIS coverage plan: 2 to 4.

Twelve additional countries have a priority of 4; 17 have a priority of 5; 17 have a priority of 6.

Proposal: Discontinue the Armed Forces sections as separate entities of the NIS Program, but the Armed Forces chapter of the General Surveys on the USSR and China would be expanded to include the most important and useful data now contained in the separate sections. Revision would occur every 3rd year

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6

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ATTACHMENT E

DRAFT  
17 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Restructuring of the National Intelligence Survey  
(NIS) Program


REFERENCE : USIB-D-51.1/8, 28 August 1963

1. The NIS Committee recommends that the remaining topical detailed sections be discontinued as part of the NIS Program and that emphasis and resources be directed toward production of a restructured and top-quality General Survey, augmented on a highly selective basis by some of the more broadly useful material from the detailed sections.

Rationale

2. Gradual attrition of the detailed sections over the years has produced a melange of topical coverage (see attachment). Shifting requirements for basic intelligence, a more realistic appraisal of what the NIS Program can achieve, and dwindling resources have each played a role in eroding the original concept of worldwide, up-to-date, and well-integrated topical coverage. Discontinuance of topics was in each case agreed to only after careful consideration

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of identifiable user requirements and availability of alternative coverage, but it is now becoming evident that the cumulative effect of the attrition is a program lacking coherence and focus.

3. Although NIS programming has adhered to the USIB-approved NIS plan for country priorities, for many of the detailed sections still being produced, area coverage has also been markedly curtailed. Transportation and Armed Forces sections, as examples, are now being produced for only a few countries. The result is a disparate and confusing pattern of coverage.

4. User surveys have indicated that some of the more specialized detailed sections have quite limited, albeit steadfast, readership. Faltering interdepartmental interest in certain topics raises the question of their continued suitability in a national intelligence program. As is conceptualized in the Reference, this specialized detailed basic intelligence was designed for the most part to meet military requirements. Much of it might appropriately be produced departmentally.

5. Continuing and increasing budgetary restrictions have taken and are taking heavy toll on the NIS Program. However, what remains can be made to meet important needs of the national security policy community by placing full emphasis on community production of a coordinated, high-quality, and broadly based General Survey which

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would better utilize the available resources than the present disparate program. Also, the production structure and organization of a new General Survey would enable the program to meet any future requirements for an expanded national basic intelligence effort.

Plan

6. Programmed production of the topical detailed sections would be discontinued by the end of FY 72.

7. The General Survey, slightly expanded and restructured in a bound-by-chapter format, would become the body of the program. In addition to providing greater efficiency and flexibility in maintenance, the new format will enable the NIS to selectively incorporate into the appropriate chapters -- or as separate annexes -- some of the more widely useful data now contained in the detailed sections. This will apply particularly to DoD-produced information which cannot be adequately produced and published departmentally.

8. The semiannually produced Basic Intelligence Factbook would continue to be published in both the classified and unclassified versions.

9. The special NIS on oceanography would be continued for another year pending the completion of an assessment of interagency requirements in this field.

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Impact

10. Total elimination of the remaining detailed sections would reduce NIS production by about 30%. Some of the manpower saving implicit in the cutback would have to be redirected to implementing the production of the enhanced General Survey. Although precise figures on anticipated money and manpower savings have not yet been determined, it is estimated that the overall NIS resources saving would be about 20%, much of which has already been realized through imposed reductions in the NIS effort.

Action Requested

11. The NIS Committee requests that USIB, in accordance with its responsibility for providing policy direction to the NIS Program as outlined in the Reference, approve the plan to discontinue production of NIS topical detailed sections by the end of FY 72 and to integrate on a selective basis broadly useful material from those sections, as appropriate, into the new General Survey.

JOHN KERRY KING  
Chairman, NIS Committee

Attachment:

Attrition of NIS Detailed Sections

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## ATTRITION OF NIS DETAILED SECTIONS

	to 1960	1961-64	1965-68	1969-72
Introduction.....	20	21	22	23
Military Geogr. Regions.....	21	22	23	24
Coasts & Landing Beaches.....	22	23	24	25
Weather & Climate.....	23	24	25	
Topography.....	24	25		
Urban Areas.....	25			
Introduction.....	30	31	32	33
Railroads.....	31	32	33	34
Highways.....	32	33	34	35
Inland Waterways.....	33	34	35	36
Ports & Naval Facilities.....	34	35	36	37
Merchant Marine.....	35	36	37	38
Civil Air.....	36	37	38	
Telecommunications.....	37	38		
Introduction.....	40	41	42	43
Population.....	41	42	43	44
Character. of the People.....	42	43	44	45
Relig., Educ., Pub. Info.....	43	44	45	46
Manpower.....	44	45	46	47
Health & Sanitation.....	45	46	47	48
Welfare.....	46	47	48	
Introduction.....	50	51	52	53
Constitutional System.....	51	52	53	54
Structure of the Govt.....	52	53	54	55
Political Dynamics.....	53	54	55	56
Public Order & Safety.....	54	55	56	57
National Policies.....	55	56	57	58
Intelligence & Security.....	56	57	58	59
Subversion & Insurgency.....	57	58	59	60
Propaganda.....	58	59	60	61
Key Personalities.....	59	60	61	62
Introduction.....	60	61	62	63
Agr., Fisheries, Forestry.....	61	62	63	64
Fuels & Power.....	62	63	64	65
Minerals & Metals.....	63	64	65	66
Manufacturing & Construction.....	64	65	66	67
Trade & Finance.....	65	66	67	68
Introduction.....	70	71	72	73
Electronics.....	71	72	73	74
Air, Ground, Naval Weapons.....	72	73	74	75
Atomic Energy.....	73	74	75	76
Biological Warfare.....	74	75	76	
Chemical Warfare.....	75	76		
Phy.Sci.,Math.,Medicine.....	76			
Introduction.....	80	81	82	83
Ground Forces.....	81	82	83	
Naval Forces.....	82	83		
Air Forces.....	83			
Map & Chart Appraisal.....	IX	1	2	3
Ports & Naval Facilities.....	Supp. I	3	4	
Coasts & Landing Beaches.....	Supp. II			
Telecommunications.....	Supp. III			
Petroleum.....	Supp. V			
Communism.....	Supp. VI			
International Communism.....	108			
Marine Climate.....	1			
Oceanography.....	2			
Effects of Climate & Ocea.....	3			
Straits.....	4			

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16 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT:

Conversation with [redacted]

[redacted] OER, re Economic Intelligence

25X1 1. As you had advised me they would, Mr. Ernst and Mr. [redacted] OER, met with me this morning to discuss NSCIC activities in the economic field. I described the discussions at the NSCIC Working Group meeting which led to Dr. Proctor's volunteering to prepare a study describing how intelligence was responding to U. S. needs for economic intelligence.

2. They were primarily interested in being informed on what the NSCIC is and what it does, what the IRAC is and what it will do, and how the new NIPE staff will function.

3. We also discussed in some detail the proposed work program for the EIC requirements working group which [redacted] chairs. This is a study which may well prove of interest to the NSCIC Working Group because it involves a large number of non-USIB agencies and calls upon them to indicate their requirements for information. The study will examine how these needs are being met and identify problem areas. An unusual aspect of this work is that those elements of the intelligence community which deal with economic intelligence represent only a small part of the resources of the U. S. Government involved in foreign economic information. This may pose some unusual questions when it comes to recommendations as to what may need to be done to improve the acquisition of economic data since, undoubtedly, there are many U. S. Government elements that have their own informal means of acquiring foreign data without using formal intelligence channels.

4. This EIC requirements study might provide a model which would be helpful for requirements studies in other areas of intelligence. I intend to stay in close touch with OER as the study develops.

[redacted]  
Chief/PRG

25X1A [redacted]  
Distribution:

orig - addressee

1 - PRG subject

1 - [redacted]

1 - PRG staff and destroy